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The Business and Legal Obstacles to the
Open Access Publishing Movement for
Science, Technical, and Medical Journals
By Leslie A. Harmel*

I. Introduction
Taxpayers provide approximately $45 billion in federal
research funding every year.' However, the taxpaying consumer
looking for information on the latest medical treatments and research
will not be able to access such information without paying for
expensive subscriptions or high per-article charges. This is because
the majority of articles resulting from that research end up in forprofit publications. 2 As a result, taxpaying consumers actually pay for
this research twice--once with their taxes to fund the research, and
again for access to that same research when it is published in the
traditional manner of expensive journals. 3 With modem technology
and the wide availability of information on the Internet, why should
consumers have such difficulty accessing important medical and
scientific research?
This comment will first discuss how a traditional publishing
business model works compared to how an open access business
model works, and why large commercial publishers are fighting open
access. Next, this comment will explain the effects that current
copyright and antitrust laws have in the publishing industry, and the
recent policy by the National Institutes of Health on making
taxpayer-funded research available for free. This comment will then

* J.D. candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A., North
Dakota State University.
' Rick Weiss, A Fight for Free Access To Medical Research; Online Plan
Challenges Publishers' Dominance, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2003, at Al.
2

Id. at Al.

3

Rick Weiss, NIH Proposes Free Access For Public to Research Data,
Sept. 6, 2004, at A21.

WASH. POST,
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analyze the need for open access, why the current laws favor
traditional publishing, and the likelihood that open access will
succeed under the current status of the law. Finally, this comment
will propose how laws and legal analysis should be changed to
encourage the open access movement.

II. Background: The Traditional Method of Publishing
and the Open Access Movement
A. Who is the Real Consumer?
Part of the problem in addressing traditional publishing versus
open access publishing is defining who the real consumer is. There
are-at least-four separate categories of consumers to consider.
First, there are the "regular" taxpaying consumers with health
concerns who are trying to obtain the latest research and
information.4 Next, there are the researchers and physicians, who use
the latest research and information to treat patients, to develop new
methods of treatment, and to continue their own research.5 Another
category of consumer is the library-be it an academic institution or
a private corporation with a large research and development
department. 6 The researchers and the libraries play the largest
"consumer" role because libraries pay the subscription fees while the
researchers actually use the information. Last, the authors of the
published articles can be considered consumers because they use
publication as a means of disseminating their work and to fulfill
tenure and promotion requirements.7 The traditional method of
publishing primarily looks to the libraries to define its "consumers,"
while the open access method focuses more on the individual
consumers, researchers and authors.

4 Weiss, supra note 1, at Al.
5 Id.
6 Albert

A. Foer, Antitrust Perspectives on Mergers in the Academic

Publishing Industry, Symposium on Antitrust Issues in Scholarly and Legal
Publishing
in
Washington
D.C.,
at
12,
available
at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/377.pdf (Feb. 11, 2005).
7 Theodore C. Bergstrom & Carl T. Bergstrom, Will Open Access Compete
Away Monopoly Profits in JournalPublishing?, at 2 (May 2, 2004), available at

http://octavia.zoology.washinton.edu/publishing/BergstromandBergstrom4b.pdf.
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B. The Traditional Method of Publishing
Traditionally, science, technical and medical ("STM")
journals publish research articles after peer review. Journals do not
pay the authors; in fact, it is a normal practice to charge the author
page fees and require the author to provide free refereeing services to
the publisher. 8 The journals then sell their publications, typically to
libraries, at annual subscription prices between $1,000 and $5,000.9
Journal publishers may also sell copies of single articles to researcher
or individual consumers, charging between $5 and $30,' ° but
individual purchases of single articles do not generate significant
revenues for publishers.'" Every journal publishes original research,
which does not appear elsewhere.' 2 Also, the publisher retains the
copyrights to any articles it publishes,' 3 so the author is unable to
publish his work in more than one STM journal. Researchers require
as much information as possible, and libraries must try to supply as
many journals as their budgets allow.' 4 As a result, each separate
journal is necessary for researchers,
even though the journals may
15
cover the same any particular field.
While most commercial publishers have pursued electronic
publication of their journals,' 6 the sales of the electronic versions are
8 Id.

at 2.

9 Weiss, supra note 1, at Al.
10

Marilyn Werber Serafini, Who Owns NIH Research?, NAT'L J., Dec. 4,

2004.
1 See Bergstrom & Bergstrom, supra note 7, at 2 (stating that journal
publishers obtain most of their revenues from subscription fees); see also Press
Release, Information Access Alliance, Information Access Alliance Will Continue
to Push for Revised Analysis of Publisher Mergers Despite Justice Department's
Recent Approval of Cinven and Candover Purchase of BertelsmannSpringer (Sept.
9, 2003), available at http://www.informationaccess.org/IAArelease91003.pdf
(stating that the primary market for STM journals is libraries).
12 Weiss, supra note 1, at Al.
13 Weiss, supra note 3, at A21.
14 Thomas

M. Susman & David J. Carter, INFORMATION ACCESS ALLIANCE,

PUBLISHER MERGERS: A CONSUMER-BASED APPROACH TO ANTITRUST ANALYSIS,

at 22, available at http://informationaccess.orgfWhitePaperV2Final.pdf
2003).
'5 Weiss, supra note 1, at Al.
16 Richard A. Danner, Electronic

(June

Publication of Legal Scholarship: New

Issues and New Models, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 347, 352 (2002).
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often bundled with the sales of the print journals.1 7 Some publishers
have made electronic-only subscription packages available18;
however, these electronic versions are often sold at a price nearly
equivalent to the price of the print journals. 19 Additionally, publishers
use tiered pricing structures to sell their electronic versions, charging
large university libraries substantially more than smaller
institutions. 20 This price-discriminating scheme allows a publisher to
set prices by determining the amount a purchasing library is willing
to pay, 2rather than setting price based on production costs of the
product. 1
C. The Open Access Model of Publishing
On the other hand, an open access publisher charges the
author to print his article, rather than charging subscribers.22 With an
open access model, the author or his institution pays a fee to have his
research posted on an Internet site after peer-review and editing,
while researchers, individual consumers and libraries have free
access. The largest U.S. open access publisher is the Public Library
of Science ("PLoS").24 PLoS charges the authors a fee of $1,500 to
disseminate their work.25 However, PLoS is additionally funded by a
grant from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and it remains
to be seen if the PLoS venture business model can continue to operate
without grant money.26
Although it is less expensive for an author to be published
under the traditional method of publication, there are other incentives
to publish in an open access forum. One incentive for authors to
17

Carl T. Bergstrom & Theodore C. Bergstrom, The Costs and Benefits of

Library Site Licenses to Academic Journals, PNAS, vol. 101, no. 3, 897, 898, (Jan.

20, 2004) availableat www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0305628101.
18

Danner, supra note 16, at 352.

'9 Bergstrom & Bergstrom, supra note 17, at 898.

ST.

20

id.

21

Id. at 898-99.

22

Bernard Wysocki, Jr., JournalsResist Free Access To Medical Data, WALL

J., Oct. 28, 2004, at B 1.
23 Id.
24 Id.

2 Id.
26 Id.
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publish articles in an open access model is to expand exposure and
stimulate discussion about their work.27 This expanded exposure not
only increases the opportunity for other researchers to expand on the
author's work, but the exposure also provides additional prestige to
the author as his work is cited more often.28 Also, with open access
publishing the author is free to publish elsewhere because the
author-not the open access publisher-retains the copyrights.29
D. Why Traditional Publishers Oppose the Open Access
Movement
Commercial publishers argue that the U.S. will lose a
valuable export through open access because overseas buyers provide
revenues. 30 Some non-profit publishers, which are typically
specialized science societies that use journal subscriptions to fund
research and scholarships, argue that open access publishing would
threaten the existence of their societies. 31 Publishers also argue that
journal articles are "too technical" for the average consumer to
understand, and therefore
access to the information would provide
32
only a small benefit.
Whether or not these arguments are significant reasons for
publishers to resist open access, there is no doubt that publishers
believe the open access model is a threat to their profits and
operations. If research is published by traditional methods and
through open access, researcher, individual consumers, and libraries
will no longer have to pay high subscription prices or per-article fees.
Commercial publishers would be unable to continue making large
profits by limiting access because the information would be available
elsewhere.

27

Laura N. Gasaway, Copyright Ownership & the Impact on Academic

Libraries,13 DEPAUL-LCA J.

ART

& ENT. L. POL'Y 277, 297 (Fall 2003).

28 Foer, supra note 6, at 14.
29 See,
e.g.,
PubMed
Central
Overview,
http://www.pubmedcentral.gov/about/intro.html (last visited May 15, 2005)
(finding that it is generally the policy of open access publishers to let the individual
author or the journal publisher to retain any copyrights).
30 Wysocki, supra note 22, at B 1.

31 Serafini, supra note 10.
32

id.
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III. Discussion of the Current Status of the Law and
Journal Publishing
A. Copyright Law
In traditional publishing, the STM journals hold copyrights to
the articles,33 and so the author is unable to publish his work
elsewhere. If the author also provides access to his published article
in an open access model, he would infringe upon the copyrights of
his STM journal publisher, who could in turn bring suit against the
author for copyright infringement. This scenario would significantly
hinder the author, whose career often depends
on publication in
3
journals for tenure, prestige and promotion.
The most recent challenge to copyright law was heard last
year by the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft.35 The Supreme
Court held that the Copyright Term Extension Act did not violate the
First Amendment, and that Congress did not exceed its power under
the Copyright Clause when it enlarged terms for future and
previously published works by twenty years.36 This case indicates the
Court's willingness to defer to Congress in matters relating to
copyright legislation.3 7 The Court stressed "it is generally for
Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the copyright
Clause's objectives." 38 As such, it is unlikely that courts would be
willing to allow an author to infringe on a publisher's copyright, even
though the article was written by the author, who simply wants the
public to have access to his work.
B. Antitrust Law
Horizontal mergers have played a large role in traditional
publishing of STM journals. The number of STM publishers, as well
as academic publishers in general, has become much more

33 Weiss,

supra note 3, at A21.

Bergstrom & Bergstrom, supra note 7, at 2.
35 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
34

36

Id. at 198.

37 Id. at
38

204.
Id. at 212.
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concentrated in recent years. 39 Mergers go relatively unchallenged
because the Department of Justice uses a narrow definition of the
market based on similar content of each journal, and seeks only
divestiture where the content of journals overlaps.4 0 Between 1997

and 2002, at least five major commercial publishers were acquired by
competitors.4a The price increase of library subscriptions to STM
journals between 1991 and 2000 was 158%, more than six times the
rate of inflation.42 With less competition and the opportunity to
bundle more titles, 4 3 publishers are able to increase prices without

much fear of having subscriptions cancelled. a The ability of a
publisher to bundle many titles not only gives the publisher power to
control prices, but also gives the publisher power to exclude
45
competition.
A typical example of how a publisher merger plays out in the
United States can be seen in the 1996 merger between Thomson
Corporation and West Publishing Company.46 The merger made
Thomson/West the largest legal publisher in the United States. 7
Lexis-Nexis, a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc. and the second largest
legal publisher in the United States, moved to intervene as one of the
parties opposing the merger on the theory that it represented the
public interest and would suffer injury if the merger went forward;
39 See Foer, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that the top ten STM publishers
account for 63.4% of the industry revenues, with the three largest commercial
publishers accounting for 45.3% of the industry revenues).

40 Susman & Carter, supra note 14, at 23.
4' Foer, supra note 6, at 3.
42 Id. at 4.

43 For an in-depth discussion on the practices of journal bundling and its
anticompetitive effects, see Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Exclusion or
Efficient Pricing? The "Big Deal" Bundling of Academic Journals, 72 Antitrust
L.J. no. 1, 128-159 (2004).

44 Foer, supra note 6, at 6.
41 See id. at 14 (stating that larger publishers may be able to squeeze out
smaller ones).
46 The Thomson/West merger affected legal publications; however, the
example is analogous to STM publisher mergers. See Susman & Carter, supra note
14, at 2, 26 (observing that legal publications serve similar functions as STM
journals and that the similarities between the two markets suggest the same
concepts can be applied to both).
47 See United States v. Thomson Corp. and West Publ'g Co., No. 96-1415
(PLF), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14819, *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1996).
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48

however, its motion was denied. The merger was approved after
Thomson and West agreed to divest certain assets and products, and
the Department of Justice was given a continuing role in approving
purchasers of those divested assets and products.4 9 Interestingly, all
of the divested assets and products were sold to Lexis-Nexis, the
main competitor. 5° Lexis-Nexis, which at first argued against the
merger, now supported the merger and contended that competition
would be enhanced by this bulk sale of Thomson/West products to a
single entity, itself.' After the merger, the average2 price of
Thomson/West titles increased more than twenty percent.
The last STM publisher merger approved by the U.S.
Department of Justice was Cinven and Candover acquisition of
BertelsmannSpringer and its merger with Kluwer Academic
Publishers. 53 The new entity, re-named Springer, is the second largest
publisher of scientific journals in the world, second to Elsevier
Science. 54 The former chief executive of Elsevier was appointed as
the new chief executive of Springer.55
Looking at just the biomedical field, significant price
increases resulted after ten of eleven publisher mergers in the past
decade.56 Most publishing mergers face little scrutiny, and mergers
have continued at a rapid pace.57 The biomedical journal market

48

Thomson Corp. and West Publ'g Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14819, at *3-

4.
United States v. Thomson Corp. and West Publ'g Co., No. 96-1515 (PLF),
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1893, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997).
50 Id. at *1.
49

51

id.

52

Susman & Carter, supra note 14, at 20.

Press Release, Information Access Alliance, Information Access Alliance
Will Continue to Push for Revised Analysis of Publisher Mergers Despite Justice
Department's Recent Approval of Cinven and Candover Purchase of
available
at
(Sept.
9,
2003)
BertelsmannSpringer
http://www.informationaccess.org/IAArelease91003.pdf.
53

54 id.
55

id.
56 Susman & Carter, supra note 14, at 4; Mark J. McCabe, Journal Pricing
and Mergers: A PortfolioApproach, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 259, 265-67 (Mar. 2002),
availableat http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~mm284/AER.pdf.
57 Mark J. McCabe, The Impact of PublisherMergers on JournalPrices: An
at
1
(Dec.
1999),
available
Update,
207ARL,
at
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illustrates the pace and impact of mergers. In 1991, Reed Elsevier
purchased Pergamon and added 57 biomedical journals to its existing
catalog of 190 biomedical journals.58 This 1991 merger resulted in a
ten percent price increase over the average rate of price increases in
the market for the journals of the merging publishers.59 In 1997 and
1998, Harcourt acquired two other publishers with 44 biomedical
journals, increasing its catalog to 162 biomedical journals. 61 In 1998
Wolters Kluwer purchased three other publishers, adding 100 titles to
its catalog of 112 biomedical journals. 61 In 2001, Reed Elsevier
purchased Harcourt, giving Reed Elsevier a total of 409 biomedical
titles. 62 The 1997-1998 purchases by Harcourt and the 1998
purchases by Wolters Kluwer resulted in averafe journal prices that
were six percent higher than pre-merger levels.
C. Recent NIH Policy
Last year, the National Institutes for Health ("NIH") proposed
that taxpayer-funded research should be made available to the public
through the Internet. 64 Under the NIH proposal, an electronic version
of a researcher's article would be made available to the public free of
charge through the digital archives of the U.S. Library of Medicine
after the article has been accepted for publication in a journal. 65 The
original policy required researchers to make their articles available
for posting within six months of its publication in a scholarly
journal.66
However, the policy as approved merely requests that
researchers make their articles available for posting-participation is
voluntary-within twelve months of final publication. 67 After the
http://www.arl.org/newsltr/207/jmlprices.html.
58 McCabe, supra note 57, at 262.
59

Id. at 264.

60

Id. at 262.

61 Id.
62

Foer, supra note 6, at 3.

63

Susman & Carter, supra note 14, at 19.

64

Wysocki, supra note 22, at B 1.
Id.

65

66 Id.
67

Lila Gutennan, Critics and ProponentsDebate NIH's Plan to Free Access
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period for public comment ended, NIH modified its proposal to
request, rather than require, researchers to make articles available
twelve months after publication. 68 The policy as approved requests
NIH-funded researchers to submit an electronic version of their
research articles for posting on the Internet, providing free access to
the public,
within twelve months of its publication in a scholarly
69
journal.

IV. Analysis: Why Open Access Faces a Difficult
Challenge
A. The Need For Open Access Publishing
Advances in science and medicine depend on research
information, and STM journals are how that information is
traditionally disseminated. Without broad distribution, there is less
information for consumers and other researchers to work with, and
this inhibits progress in science and medicine.71 On the other hand,
quick dissemination of new science promotes progress in science and
medicine. The latest medical information could help patients with
rare diseases who are considering treatment-but only if those
patients have access to that information.
Because the cost of these scholarly journals is so expensive
(between $1,000 and $5,000),72 and libraries cannot provide complete
access due to their budget constraints,73 the latest scientific findings
are not available to the average taxpayer. The original NIH proposal
would have created "open access" to the general public of the
otherwise virtually unattainable taxpayer-funded research in areas
such as cancer treatments. The benefit to these individual consumers
of open access is that the information is available faster, not only to
the individual consumers themselves, but also to their physicians
to Scientific Materials, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 7, 2005, at 28.
68

id.

69 Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications Resulting
From NIH-Funded Research, 70 Fed. Reg. 6891-01 (Feb. 9, 2005).
70 Susman & Carter, supra note 14, at 1.
71
72

73

Id. at 12.
Weiss, supra note 1, at Al.
Serafini, supra note 10.
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(who are helping them make their treatment decisions) and other
researchers (who can build on that information to discover other
possible treatments). In particular, consumers and physicians in
smaller communities without access to research libraries would
benefit from open access. 74 Without timely access, research is
insufficient and incomplete, and progress does not occur as
efficiently as possible.
The individual consumers, who are also taxpayers, actually
pay twice--once with their taxes to fund the research, and again for
access to that same research published in a journal. 75 These singlearticle charges add up quickly, limiting access to information that an
individual consumer might feel is necessary to make an informed
decision about his health. Better and timelier access of the latest
medical research would be available directly to individual consumers
and their physicians. With that research more readily available,
individual consumers can make better-informed decisions about their
healthcare and medical options.
B. The Current Status of the Law Strongly Favors the
Traditional Method of Publishing
The type of bundling and price discrimination practiced by
commercial STM publisher is common in the market for electronic
publications.76 Bundling decreases competition because a large
publisher can bundle many titles and tie up significant purchasing
library

dollars.77 This

forecloses

any smaller

publisher

from

competing because it does not have the wider range of titles, and the
library's budget is tied up purchasing the bundle. 78 There is no money
left over in the library's budget to purchase journals outside the large
publisher's bundle. Because demand for STM journals is inelastic,
commercial publishers are able to raise prices without much fear of
losinw business because their audience, mostly libraries, is a captive
one. In addition, STM publishers have the ability to create a market
for any new journals they want to sell by including the new journal in

74 Weiss, supra note 3, at A21.
75 Id.
76

Susman & Carter, supra note 14, at 30.

77 id.
78

Id.

79 Danner, supra note 16, at 351.
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the bundled package. A library may prefer to spend money on
continuing a subscription to a particular publication, or simply have
no need for the new journal, but is forced to purchase the new journal
because it is included in the bundle offered by the publisher.
Another reason that publishers are able to increase prices
dramatically is that the STM publishing industry, as well as academic
publishing in general, has become much more concentrated.8 °
Mergers go basically unchallenged due to the narrow definition of the
market, which is based on similar content. 81 Where content of
journals overlaps, the Department is likely to seek some type of
divestiture. 82 However, as seen in the Thomson/West merger
example, the divested titles are often purchased by another large
publisher. 83 This approach does not take into consideration that
journals with similar content are not substitutes for each other, like
other tangible consumer products are. 84 Journals with similar content
do not contain the same research articles; therefore, one journal
cannot really substitute another.
Traditional antitrust merger analysis using the similar content
approach to defining the market does not work because journals in a
particular field are not necessarily substitutes. A thorough researcher
needs all articles in his field, and therefore needs access to more than
one journal subscription in a given field. This gives each publisher a
higher degree of market power than in an industry where buyers
purchase only one product. 85 Even though a merged publisher has
market share below thirty or forty percent, it still has the power to
substantially raise prices without losing market share,86 because the
publisher can charge what it thinks the library can afford.
Furthermore, this approach neglects to consider the way in
which journals are actually purchased-mostly by libraries with
limited budgets that compare items across a much broader spectrum
than journal content-and the unilateral effects of close substitutes
80

Foer, supra note 6, at 2.

81 Susman & Carter, supra note 14, at 23.
82

id.

83

Thomson Corp. and West Publ'g Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1893, at *1.

g4 See Susman & Carter, supra note 14, at 23 (describing the example that if a
consumer buys one brand of auto tires, he will not also need another brand of auto
tires to ensure the safe operation of his automobile).
85 Id. at 28.

86

Id. at 29.
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merging. 87 As a result, neurology journals compete with biochemistry
journals due to the constraints of the library's budget. 88 When
publishers merge, the profits from the neurology journal and the
biochemistry journal now go to the same publisher. The publisher
benefits by a raise in price of either journal or both journals, without
fear of losing profits, because the library will still buy one or the
other, or continue to buy both despite the price increase.
Current antitrust analysis also fails to recognize the other
barriers to entry in STM journal publication, such as journal
reputation, the high cost of switching subscriptions, and the fact that
library purchasers tend to continue current subscriptions in order to
keep the set of publications that have already been purchased up to
date.8 9
C. The Likelihood of Success of the Open Access Movement
A potentially huge factor in the success of an open access
model is whether or not the open access publisher can provide
prestige to the authors. 90 One of the keys to the likelihood of success
of PLoS is that its founders, Harold Varmus, Patrick 0. Brown, and
Michael Eisen, provide immediate credibility to the project. 91 Harold
Varmus won a Nobel Prize in 1989 for work with cancer viruses and
headed NIH for six years; Patrick 0. Brown is a renowned genomics
expert at Stanford University School of Medicine; and Michael Eisen
is a biologist at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the
University of California at Berkeley.92
Commercial publishers argue that the open access model,
even where the author pays to have his work published, will not be
able to cover the costs of publishing without continued support from
grants or increasing author fees.9 3 They argue that, without grant
money, the funding for an open access business model cannot sustain

87

Id. at 26.

88

Id. at 26.

89 Foer, supra note 6, at 4.

90 Weiss, supra note 1, at Al.
91 Id.
92 id.

93 See Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Journals Resist Free Access To Medical Data,

WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2004, at B1 (estimating that the costs of publishing, editing
and archiving range from $4,000 to $6,000).
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the publishing costs, and authors will submit their work to traditional
publishers to avoid the increase in author fees. This argument
assumes that authors pay the publishing fees out of their own pockets,
and could not afford any fee increases. The reality is that traditional
publishers also charge authors fees, and those fees are often
subsidized by the author's institution or grant funding. 94 There is no
reason that, just because an author chooses an open access publisher,
that the author's institution or grant funding would no longer
subsidize the author fees.

V. Proposal for Legal Changes to Promote Open Access
There are a number of ways which Congress and the courts
can encourage open access publishing. With regard to copyright
issues, Congress could expand the Fair Use Doctrine 95 to include
posting of STM journal articles which are taxpayer-funded, so that
the traditional publisher has no copyright infringement claim against
an author who makes his work available through open access
publishing. 96 A more dramatic approach would be for Congress to
completely eliminate copyrights for research that is substantially
funded by the federal government 97-the research and subsequent
articles would go directly into the public domain without copyright
protections. Either of these changes to copyright law supports the
rationale that some information is so useful and important that it
should not be subject to copyright protection.
Courts have traditionally been very reluctant to order the
reversing of a merger, even when it turns out the merger resulted in
significant anti-competitive behavior. Courts should be more willing
to "unscramble the egg" 98 after a merger. The publishing industry
provides a unique forum for this concept. Publishers are familiar with

94 Serafini, supra note 10.
95 The Fair Use Doctrine provides for the legal use of copyrighted material for
the purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching.. . , scholarship, or
research. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (West 2005).
96

See Darcy L. Jones, As Congress Giveth, So Congress Taketh Away: The

Supreme Court Assures CongressionalAuthority to Retroactively Extend Copyright

Terms in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 55 Mercer L. Rev. 779, 794 (Winter 2004) (predicting
that public domain advocates will argue for an enlarged definition of fair use
protections).
97 Weiss, supra note 1, at Al.
98 Foer, supra note 6, at 7-8.
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the process of divesting assets and titles in order to have their
proposed merger approved. Courts could maintain jurisdiction for a
period of time after the merger, and if significant anti-competitive
behavior results after a publishing merger, the courts could revisit the
divestiture decisions. The goal in revisiting the merger would be
promoting competition to keep prices down. This could include an
approach where courts not only examine more carefully the effects of
the merger, but also exercise heightened scrutiny in approving
divestitures. Ordering a divestiture, but approving the sale of all
divested titles to the merging publishers' biggest competitor should
be viewed with strong skepticism, as such a divestiture increases the
opportunity for competitors to collude and to raise prices.
Recognizing that reversing a merger is not always
economically practical, courts could take other steps when analyzing
publishing mergers. Government enforcement and the courts could
chose to define the market according to the way libraries categorize
journals during their purchasing process, since libraries are the main
purchasers of academic journals. 99 In defining the market in this
manner, the court would have a better picture of which journals are
competing for limited budget dollars. If the journals of merging
publishers compete for library budget dollars, then the courts should
be more willing to block the merger.100 Under this approach, the
court would be able to better focus on the goal of disseminating as
much information as possible to those end-users, the researchers
themselves and consumers, who are not providing a significant
portion of the publisher's revenues.
Another option in merger analysis is to consider lowering the
threshold market power percentage to reflect actual market power by
merging publishers. Because the characteristics of STM journal
markets differ from traditional product markets, traditional market
power analysis should not be used to analyze publisher mergers. 0 1 A
publisher with market share below thirty or forty percent still has
significant market power to substantially raise prices without losing
market share because researchers need all articles in a given field.
Since journals with similar content do not contain the same articles,
researchers cannot substitute one journal for another.
Last, the original NIH proposal requiring taxpayer-funded
99 Susman & Carter, supra note 14, at 29.
100 Id. at 32.
10

id. at 32-33.
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researchers to submit their articles for posting on a government
website within six months of publication should be considered again
in the future. When searching for medical information, consumers
should not have to pay additional fees for the latest research, which
was already funded with their tax dollars. Also, in having at least
some research openly available, the overall market would become
more elastic. Individual consumers and researchers would at least
have the choice to purchase a subscription or pay the per-article fee,
or wait six months until the information was provided free of charge.

VI. Conclusion
The purpose of the traditional publishing model has become
to increase profits, rather than to disseminate important research
information. Given the rising costs of traditional publication,
resulting in large part from the economics of publisher mergers, the
open access movement will only become stronger as consumer
demand for scientific and medical research becomes stronger.
Eventually libraries and researchers will refuse to pay ever increasing
subscription prices, and individual consumers will demand
reasonable access to research information within a reasonable time
period, particularly when their tax dollars fund the research. Of
course, traditional publishing and open access publishing are not
exclusive options.10 What the open access model does is provide an
alternative to traditional publishing, ensuring the wide dissemination
of information needed to achieve new technologies and better
medical treatments.
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